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RESSENYES
Nominalism Unscathed
Nelson Goodman is widely considered 
one of the foremost philosophers of the 
20th century. He made significant con-
tributions to metaphysics, epistemology 
and the philosophy of art. Standardly his 
works are considered in isolation, and are 
not seen as resting upon each other in 
any significant way. In Nominalism and 
its Aftermath: the Philosophy of Nelson 
Goodman, Dena Shottenkirk (Lecturer at 
Brooklyn College in New York) attempts 
to unite Goodman’s philosophical enter-
prises under the nominalist framework 
he worked in. This is an insightful and 
promising line of inquiry. However, the 
book falls short of its goal due to miscon-
ceptions of Goodman’s philosophical 
positions.
The work is composed of three main 
sections that focus on Goodman’s meta-
physics, epistemology and philosophy of 
art. Each section draws heavily on the 
conclusions of its predecessors. Given the 
chronological order of Goodman’s major 
publications (The Structure of Appearance 
(1951), Fact, Fiction and Forecast (1955), 
and Languages of Art (1968)), this is 
plausible. However, as Shottenkirk rec-
ognizes, themes from all three interweave 
Goodman’s work, so it would be a mis-
take to end the discussion there.
To understand the motivation be-
hind Goodman’s nominalism, some 
background may be helpful. According 
to naïve set theory, any collection of 
items constitutes a set. Unfortunately, 
this gives rise to the Russell paradox. The 
set of all sets that do not contain them-
selves contains itself if and only if it does 
not contain itself. Although intuitively 
plausible, it is inconsistent. Further, be-
cause arithmetic reduces to set theory, if 
naïve set theory is set theory, mathemat-
ics as a whole rests on shaky ground. 
Thus several mathematicians including 
Russell developed amended versions of 
set theory. Russell’s ramified theory 
of types constrains set membership in a 
manner that he describes as «perverse» 
(Bertrand Russell 1908). Every other 
non-naïve set theory contains elements 
that are equally unintuitive. All are des-
perate expedients to restore consistency.
Nelson Goodman took a much bold-
er course. He denied the existence of sets, 
restricting his ontology to individuals. 
The two guiding principles governing his 
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nominalism are ‘entities are identical just 
in case their parts are identical’ and ‘there 
is no entity without an identity’. The first 
principle excludes set theory, because 
many different sets have exactly the same 
elements. The second excludes intension-
al entities such as properties, because they 
lack determinate identity conditions. 
Anything that satisfies the two conditions 
qualifies as an individual — so it is pos-
sible for abstract, concrete, mental and 
physical things to be individuals. Good-
man devoted much of his early career to 
determining what could be accomplished 
with such a limited ontological frame-
work. He and Henry Leonard developed 
a version of mereology — the calculus of 
individuals (Nelson Goodman and 
Henry Leonard 1940). In ‘Steps toward 
a Constructive Nominalism’ (1947) 
Goodman and W. V. Quine investigated 
how much of mathematics could be sal-
vaged in an ontology without sets.
Philosophers standardly assume that 
so drastically restricting metaphysical re-
sources must yield an impoverished phi-
losophy. However, in The Structure of 
Appearance, Goodman shows that es-
chewing sets, properties and natural 
kinds can be liberating. We can acknowl-
edge that members of any extension have 
something in common — i.e., the mem-
bership in that extension. Atypical kinds 
may be interesting and informative. 
There is no incentive to think that there 
is a single, basic way the world is. In The 
Structure of Appearance Goodman devel-
ops a phenomenalist system to illustrate 
the power of his form of nominalism. 
But he does not claim that it does or 
should underwrite physicalism. There are 
many ways things can be organized. Phe-
nomenalism is a way of structuring ap-
pearances.
The Structure of Appearance is a work 
in formal philosophy that is heavily influ-
enced by Carnap’s Aufbau (1928). Ob-
serving parallels with logical positivism, 
Shottenkirk says that Goodman claims 
that «philosophy is not about ‘the world’ 
but about the language through which we 
see the world, and the latter is primarily 
ascertained through science» (68). This is 
wrong on multiple counts. It is at best 
misleading to say that Goodman thinks 
that philosophy is not about the world. 
He holds that symbols refer to items in 
the world. The word ‘cat’ and a picture 
of a cat is about a cat, not about the way 
we represent cats. The word ‘individual’ 
is about an individual, not about the way 
we represent individuals. Goodman does 
not hold that understanding is couched 
exclusively in language. In Languages of 
Art he claims that works of art function 
in non-linguistic symbol-systems which 
enable us to understand things in non-
linguistic ways. He denies that under-
standing is primarily achieved through 
science. He insists that «the arts must be 
taken no less seriously than the sciences 
as modes of discovery, creation and en-
largement of knowledge in the broad 
sense of advancement of the understand-
ing» (WW, 102).
One of the most glaring mistakes in 
Nominalism and its Aftermath concerns 
the presentation of the grue paradox. 
Goodman is well known for demonstrat-
ing that we do not have an adequate con-
ception of inductive validity. Previously, 
many thinkers accepted the principle 
that if one has observed many A’s in the 
past and they have all been B’s and no 
A’s that are not B’s, one has reason to 
believe that unobserved A’s are also B’s. 
Then Goodman introduced ‘grue’. 
Something is grue just in case it is ob-
served before time t and found to be 
green, or not observed before time t and 
is blue. If time t is in the future, all ob-
served emeralds have the property of 
being grue — for all emeralds have been 
observed before time t and have been 
found to be green. Given the inductive 
principle set out above, we have induc-
tive evidence that all emeralds are grue. 
But the same evidence supports the con-
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clusion that all emeralds are green. So by 
the above principle, our observations 
provide reason to believe that an emerald 
not observed before t is both green and 
blue. This is preposterous. Shottenkirk 
mischaracterizes the problem. She states: 
«Since evidence statements regarding all 
the emeralds before t confirm that they 
are all grue, they unfortunately confirm, 
in turn, both of the competing hypoth-
eses, e.g., 1) that all emeralds are green 
and 2) that all emeralds are blue» (84). 
This is incorrect. The observation of 
green emeralds does not confirm the hy-
pothesis that all emeralds are blue — in-
deed, it disproves it. If all that is required 
for confirmation is conformity to the 
evidence, the observation confirms that 
emeralds that have not been observed 
before time t are blue. That in itself is 
problematic.
Goodman argues that not all predi-
cates are projectible; so not all are suita-
ble for using in induction or projecting 
from known to unknown cases. Predi-
cates like ‘green’ are projectible and 
predicates like ‘grue’ are not. Although 
all emeralds observed before t are grue, 
we cannot make inductive inferences 
from that fact to the conclusion that all 
emeralds are grue. The critical question 
is what accounts for projectibility.
Shottenkirk holds that Goodman’s 
answer is a form of social constructivism. 
«Predicates are entrenched because they 
are in accordance with the practice of the 
community» (85). This is incorrect for 
several reasons. Goodman claims that a 
predicate is entrenched if it and its cog-
nates have been projected far more often 
than any rivals it has. Non-projective 
uses of predicates are irrelevant. Because 
he includes cognates, his analysis is not 
dependent on any particular community. 
That ‘green’ is entrenched depends not 
only on the use of ‘green’ in projections 
by English speakers, but also on the use 
of ‘verde’ in projections by Spanish 
speakers, and on the use of all transla-
tions and coextensive terms in projec-
tions by speakers in any community. 
Further, entrenchment is not sufficient 
for projectibility. A projectible hypoth-
esis must also have known positive in-
stances, no known negative instances, 
and some undetermined instances. 
Whether or not a given predicate like 
«green» was projected in the past is de-
pendent on the ways various linguistic 
communities used words. But whether a 
predicate is projectible is not a matter of 
community consensus.
Shottenkirk intimates that the grue 
paradox is problematic for Goodman be-
cause his nominalist framework does not 
allow natural kinds. If this were so, the 
paradox would not have had the monu-
mental impact on epistemology that it 
did. Everyone concerned with induction 
or counterfactual reasoning has to take it 
seriously, not only nominalists. Recog-
nizing natural kinds does not solve the 
problem. Goodman’s challenge to realists 
is: even if there are natural kinds, what 
justifies you in thinking that ‘green’, 
rather than ‘grue’ is one of them?
A further problem with Nominalism 
and its Aftermath is that it mischaracter-
izes Goodman’s epistemological stance. 
Shottenkirk states that Goodman «main-
tains a modified coherentism» (77). Al-
though she admits that he is not strict 
coherentist, she holds that he simply al-
tered a coherence account of knowledge. 
This is not an accurate description. His-
torically, epistemologies were character-
ized as foundationalist or coherentist. 
Foundationalism maintains that knowl-
edge is grounded on beliefs whose cer-
tainty derives from experience or reason. 
Coherentism maintains that knowledge 
is grounded in a given belief’s function-
ing within a coherent system in which 
each belief supports and is supported by 
the others in that system. A typical prob-
lem with foundationalism is that even 
the most basic beliefs can be thrown into 
question. They are not certain. The 
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problem with coherentism is that it is 
perfectly possible to have a system of 
completely coherent but false beliefs. 
One of Goodman’s most significant 
contributions to epistemology was to 
devise a way to avoid both objections. 
He holds that the beliefs we have are 
initially credible. That someone believes 
that p is sufficient for there to be a 
slight reason to believe that p. However, 
initial credibility is a very weak and lim-
ited degree of credibility. If our initially 
credible beliefs come into conflict with 
one another, we make adjustments. We 
revise them to bring them into agree-
ment. «A rule is amended if it yields an 
inference we are unwilling to accept; an 
inference is rejected if it violates a rule 
we are unwilling to amend. The process 
of justification is the delicate one of 
making mutual adjustments between 
rules and accepted inference; and in the 
agreement achieved lies the only justifi-
cation needed for either» (FFF, 64). 
When a balance is struck, we are in a 
state of reflective equilibrium. Because 
we are dealing with initially credible be-
liefs, the system is not fully coherentist, 
but because their coherence within a 
system strengthens their credibility, the 
system is also not fully foundationalist. 
Goodman’s insight is that foundational-
ism is right in holding that something 
beyond coherence is required, but that 
coherentism is right in holding that 
nothing is certain independent of the 
other beliefs we hold.
Shottenkirk’s discussion of Good-
man’s aesthetics is problematic as well. 
One of the central theses in Languages 
of Art is that works of art function as 
symbols in symbol systems. This does 
not mean, as Shottenkirk claims, that 
art «is understood through the language 
that describes it» (152). One under-
stands a work of art by understanding it 
as a symbol in the symbol system in 
which it functions. The symbol system 
need not be linguistic. We understand 
an impressionist painting or tone poem 
that we have before never observed be-
cause we know from our encounters 
with other impressionist works how to 
read impressionist symbols. Music, 
painting, dance, and architecture use 
non-linguistic symbols.
Unlike linguistic symbols, paintings 
are syntactically and semantically dense. 
Slight differences in marks on a canvas 
constitute differences in what the symbol 
is and what it refers to. Linguistic sym-
bols are not so fine-grained. They are 
semantically dense but not syntactically 
dense. If Don Quixote were printed with 
14-point font instead of 12-point font, it 
would be the same work of literature. 
Further, works of art exemplify. They 
refer to labels they instantiate. Goodman 
is careful to note that not all labels are 
linguistic. The labels exemplified in a 
work of art can also belong to a syntacti-
cally and semantically dense system. This 
is why we cannot say exactly what the 
Mona Lisa’s smile expresses. It meta-
phorically exemplifies an elusive label for 
something that has no word.
While discussing the implications of 
nominalism on Goodman’s philosophy 
of art, Shottenkirk maintains that Good-
man cannot recognize mental states or 
entities. She says that this clearly follows 
from his rejection of intensional entities 
(146-7). This is not correct. Goodman 
cannot countenance mental states or enti-
ties without determinate identity condi-
tions, but Shottenkirk provides no argu-
ment that mental entities lack determinate 
identity conditions. Goodman maintains 
that works of art vehicles for understand-
ing, hence that aesthetics is a branch of 
epistemology. He holds that «in aesthet-
ic experiences, the emotions function 
cognitively» (LA, 248). This would be 
utterly unintelligible if he held that emo-
tions do not exist.
Shottenkirk began with a promising 
premise. However, misunderstandings in 
Goodman’s philosophical positions 
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hinder her progress. To those unac-
quainted with Goodman’s work this 
book would be more confusing than re-
vealing. To those familiar with Good-
man, enough time would be spent catch-
ing errors that it makes this work a 
challenging read. Shottenkirk may be 
right to hold that Goodman’s nominal-
ism creates difficulties for his epistemol-
ogy and philosophy of art. But Nominal­
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La relación entre el arte y la política, 
entre el poder y la cultura, ha sido obje-
to de debate por siglos. Una premisa 
recurrente dentro de estos debates es 
que toda acción humana es política, está 
vinculada a la coyuntura o ideología de 
su tiempo, entonces toda obra de arte es 
política, todo arte es político. Justamen-
te ésa es la premisa que cuestiona Cris-
pin Sartwell en su última publicación 
Political Aesthetics. El libro discute —a 
través de un análisis histórico, cultural 
y filosófico— una serie de cuestiones 
contemporáneas que surgen en la inter-
sección, a menudo problemática, entre 
el arte y la política. El autor desarrolla 
una interesante reflexión a partir de una 
serie de ejemplos o casos de estudio tales 
como las películas de propaganda nazi 
de Leni Riefenstahl o la música punk y 
los grafitis, para así examinar el alcance 
y el reclamo de la estética política. En 
este libro, diseñado como un tratado no 
convencional y poco ortodoxo de esté-
tica y política, se plantea y defiende la 
importancia fundamental de la estética 
política como componente constituyen-
te de los sistemas políticos, los regíme-
nes y las ideologías. Esta tesis está argu-
mentada por un meticuloso análisis, 
animado por rasgos de ingenio y perspi-
cacia, que oscila entre los diversos casos 
de estudio y recorridos teoréticos a tra-
vés de conceptos centrales como la be-
lleza y la sublimidad, el lenguaje y la 
forma o la representación y el estado.
El autor, Crispin Sartwell (1958), es 
profesor de filosofía e historia del arte 
en Dickinson College, Pensilvania. 
Igualmente, ha enseñado filosofía, co-
municación y ciencias políticas en dife-
rentes instituciones académicas, entre 
las que se encuentran Vanderbilt Uni-
versity, The University of Alabama, 
Penn State y The Maryland Institute 
College of Art. También es periodista y 
crítico de música. Se doctoró por la 
Universidad de Virginia con la tesis ti-
tulada Art and Articulation (pictorial 
representation in Dewey, Heidegger, 
Goodman, Gadamer) dirigida por Ri-
chard Rorty. Autodenominado anar-
quista, ha publicado varios libros entre 
los que se encuentran Six Names of 
Beauty y Against the State: An Introduc­
tion to Anarchist Political Theory.
Political Aesthetics está dividido en 
siete capítulos contenidos entre la intro-
ducción y la conclusión final, de los 
cuales cuatro de ellos son casos de estu-
dio y los otros tres, marcos teóricos. 
Cada capítulo teórico despliega algunos 
de los más relevantes recursos de cada 
una de estas disciplinas: estética filosó-
fica, filosofía política e historia del arte, 
para evidenciar algunas de las conexio-
